MD5 is a well-known and widely-used cryptographic hash function. It has received renewed attention from researchers subsequent to the recent announcement of collisions found by Wang et al. [14] . To date, however, the method used by researchers in this work has been fairly difficult to grasp.
1 Introduction
• We demonstrate new methods for decreasing the search complexity when finding collisions.
• We provide an "MD5 Toolkit" that uses the above optimizations to produce MD5 collisions faster than any other known implementation; it also serves as a platform for testing further improvements and new ideas
Along the way, we correct many of the mistakes made by previous authors in their published analyses, using what we believe is an improvement in notation. Also, in contrast to the other publications above, we provide full source code implementing our methods as an "MD5 Toolkit." Our hope is that this toolkit will serve as a useful device for researchers wishing to explore further techniques in this line of work. For example, making further code optimizations or search optimizations, adding further conditions, or searching for differential paths in an automated way. The MD5 Toolkit can be found at http://www.cs.colorado.edu/~jrblack/md5toolkit.tar.gz.
Our ultimate goal as a research community is to understand as best we can the way these iterated hash functions work, and the best known attacks against them. Our hope is that the observations offered here, along with the specific improvements we make for MD5 collision-finding, will lead to progress along these lines.
Overview of the Paper. We begin by covering the notation used throughout the paper. Section 3 reviews the specification of MD5. We then give a high-level overview of the attacks and touch on the motivation and theory behind the attacks in section 4. Then we move on to the details of the attack in section 5.
The remainder of the paper is devoted to detailing our insights and improvements. Specific to MD5, we offer improvements that reduce the best-known time complexity [8] by roughly a factor of three. The methods used by the Chinese team require an expected 2 37 MD5 computations to find the first block pair of the colliding messages, and an expected 2 30 MD5 computations to find the second block pair. Klima [8] improved the attack so that an expected 2 33 and 2 24 MD5 computations are needed to find the first and second, respectively, message block pairs, although Klima did not implement his improved attack for finding the second block pair. Our method improves the attack so that an expected 2 30 MD5 computations are required to find the first block pair, and we implement Klima's code for finding the second block pair.
The Wang team reported that the example collision they found for the first block took about an hour on an IBM supercomputer, and the second block pair was found in 15 seconds to 5 minutes on the same computer. Our code produces both blocks in an average of 11 minutes on a commodity PC.
Notation
All indices start at 0. This is in contrast to the notation used in the Wang et al. papers, as well as [6, 8] . Thus, for a 4-byte unsigned integer x, the bits are labeled from 0 to 31, with 0 referring to the least significant bit. Let {0, 1} n denote the set of all binary strings of length n. For an alphabet Σ, let Σ * denote the set of all strings with elements from Σ. Let Σ + = Σ * − { } where denotes the empty string. For strings s, t, let s t denote the concatenation of s and t. For a binary string s let |s| denote the length of s. For a string s where |s| is a multiple of n, let |s| n denote |s|/n. Given binary strings s, t such that |s| = |t|, let s ⊕ t denote the bitwise XOR of s and t. For a string M such that |M | is a multiple of n, |M | n = k, then we will use the notation M = (M 0 , M 1 , M 2 , . . . , M k−1 ) such that |M 0 | = |M 1 | = |M 2 | = . . . = |M k−1 | = n. We will also use the notation M = (m 0 , m 2 , . . . , m k−1 ) such that |m 0 | = |m 2 | = . . . = |m k−1 | = n. This latter notation is used when n = |m i | = 32. The former notation will be used when n = |M i | = 512. We may think of M as a k-tuple if it is convenient (hence the vector notation). Generally, the symbol M will be used for members of ({0, 1} 512 ) + . For a set S of the form {A i : a ≤ i ≤ b}, we will sometimes denote S as A a:b .
XOR Differential vs. Subtraction Differential. These methods use a combination of the XOR differential and the subtraction differential, but with an emphasis on the subtraction differential. That is, for two integers x, x ∈ [0, 2 31 − 1], consider the function ∆ X (x, x ) = x ⊕ x . This defines the XOR differential for x, x . Alternatively, define ∆ S (x, x ) as x − x mod 2 32 . This is the subtraction differential.
The Chinese authors supply two columns of differentials in their tables of differentials for each step. One column contains the subtraction differential. Another contains what is essentially the XOR differential, but there is extra information included to indicate bit differences. For example, let ∆ S (x, x ) = 2 2 . There are many possibilities for ∆ X (x, x ) such as these three examples.
• ∆ X (x, x ) = 0x00000004 (there is only one bit different between x and x , in index 2)
• ∆ X (x, x ) = 0x0000000c (bit 3 is set in x but is not set in x, bit 2 is not set in x but is set in x)
• ∆ X (x, x ) = 0x0000fffc (bit 15 is set in x but is not set in x, bits 2 through 14 are not set in x but are set in x
The differential used in [13, 14] captures this type of information by the following notation. Let x be in [0, 2
. From this information one can compute both ∆ X (x, x ) and ∆ S (x, x ) if and only if for every index i for which x and x differ i ∈ {a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n , b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b m }. The complete differential tables in the appendix use this specialized differential, but with the above property so that both ∆ X and ∆ S may be computed.
The MD5 Algorithm
The following is a brief description of MD5 using the notation that is used to describe the attacks later in this paper. We omit message padding in this description since it has no effect on our attacks. The full specification for MD5 can be found in [10] .
MD5 is a hash function in the Merkle-Damgård paradigm [3, 9] , where the security of the hash function reduces to the security of its compression function. The MD5 compression function, which we denote as MD5 c , accepts as input a 128-bit chaining value CV which we break into four 32-bit values cv 0 , cv 1 , cv 2 , cv 4 and a 512-bit message block M and outputs a 128-bit chaining value CV . Formally, MD5 c : {0,
The compression function MD5 c
We now detail the compression function used in MD5. There are 64 intermediate values produced, which we will call step values and denote by Q i for 0 ≤ i < 64. The step values are computed in the following fashion:
Where s i , y i are step-dependent constants and w i is the i-th block of the initial message expansion. For 0 ≤ i < 64, w i = m j for some 0 ≤ j < 16. The exact message expansion can be found in [10] . By 'x + y' we mean the addition of x and y modulo 2 32 , and by 'x ≪ y' we mean the circular left shift of x by y bit positions (similarly, 'x ≫ y' denotes the circular right shift of x by y bit positions).
The Φ function is defined in the following manner:
Q −1 , . . . , Q −4 are determined by the chaining values to MD5 so that
The chaining values are initially set to, in big endian byte order,
After all 64 steps are computed, MD5 c computes
and outputs CV ← cv 0 cv 1 cv 2 cv 3 . Because of their importance later, we repeat some of our notation and terminology: for each message block, MD5 c has four rounds, each of which computes 16 step values (for a total of 64). It is not described in [14] or elsewhere how they chose the values for a i , but in the next subsection we conjecture some ideas on their derivation. Regardless, Wang et al. detail methods for efficiently finding such M by determining conditions on the Q i such that if those conditions are satisfied then the differentials hold with high probability ( [14] mistakenly labels the conditions as 'sufficient'). Very little information is given in [14] as to how the conditions on the Q i are obtained from the given differentials, but an excellent analysis is given by Hawkes, Paddon, and Rose in [6] .
High-Level Overview
Wang's method for finding an M of the correct form can be described in pseudocode as the following:
Algorithm Find Collision while collision found is false do:
1. Use random seeds and deterministic methods to find M which satisfies most conditions on Q i 2. Compute all Q i and Q i to check to see if differentials are correct 3. if (rest of differentials hold) then collision found ← true else collision found ← false end do return M
We also note here that the above pseudocode is actually done once for each block of M . First a 512-bit block M 0 is found that satisfies all first-block differentials, then block M 1 is found. Figure 1 : Output differences for F = Φi, 0 ≤ i < 16 and G = Φi, 16 ≤ i < 32
Finding the differentials and conditions
Generating Message Differentials. The derivation of the message and step value differentials used by Wang remains unexplained. We attempt here to conjecture how these were derived, although we stress that this is pure speculation and guesswork. We begin by noting the following three things:
• The Φ function for round three is just the bitwise XOR of the inputs and is therefore linear -any change in one of the inputs necessarily changes the output in the same bits (formally, for any six 32-bit unsigned integers u, v, w, x, y, z,
On a related note, as can be seen in figure 1 , Φ i for 0 ≤ i < 32 has some 'absorbing' properties. That is, it is common that bit changes in the input do not change the output.
• The differential is 0 for the last few step values in round 2 and the first few step values for round 3.
• The differential is 2 31 for almost all step values in rounds 3 and 4.
Before continuing, we digress slightly to answer the following question: How is this difference in bit 31 propagated through round 3? The last few steps of round two have differential of zero and the first bit difference introduced (by way of the differential in M ) in round 3 is in step 34: In step 36, no difference is introduced by the message word used. The step value is computed as follows.
Another bit difference is introduced by the message word in step 37.
One can then easily verify that if no further bit differences are introduced via the message words, for step values Q i in round 3 with i ≥ 38,
. Thus, the bit 31 cascades down the step values without further conditions. 3 Using the linearity of H and addition of 2 31 modulo 2 32 is a clever way to minimize the differences in the step values in round 3, where the Φ function does not have the difference absorbing properties of the Φ functions of rounds 1 and 2.
The above analysis leads us to believe the following course of action was used in determining the message and step value differentials:
• Assume that whatever message differences are introduced in the first and second rounds can be absorbed by the Φ i functions so that there are no differences in the step values used in the first step of round 3.
• Pick message differences so that the difference in bit 31 cascades through the step values. This involves:
-Let the differential be m b = m b + 2 31 , m c = m c + 2 31 and m a = m a + 2 31−si where s i is the shift value for round i.
• Find a differential path through the first and second rounds, using the message differentials chosen above, so that the difference for the last four step values in round 2 is zero.
• Find sufficient conditions on the step values to guarantee the differential path (the work done in [6] is an excellent resource on this step).
• For the above step try to minimize 2nd round conditions to avoid complicated multi-message modification techniques.
This third to last step is still surrounded in mystery, but one can see that by the properties of the Φ i functions for rounds 1 and 2 that the task is possible. Although the step update function for MD4 and RIPEMD is different than that of MD5, the Wang et al. attacks [13] on those functions support the above analysis. That is, there is no difference in the step values for the last few steps of round 2 and the message differentials appear to have been chosen to minimize differences in round three by exploiting the linearity of bit 31. Again, we stress that this analysis is guesswork and we eagerly await a full exposition by the authors of [13, 14] .
Output differences for H = Φi, 32 ≤ i < 48 and I = Φi, 48 ≤ i < 64
Fulfilling the Conditions. Conditions on Q i are conditions on the individual bits of Q i . For example, for the first block near-collision of MD5 to guarantee the differential they require that the 8-th least significant bit of Q 4 is zero. There are a total of 290 conditions on the round values for the first block attack, and there a total of 310 conditions for step values in the second block. However, most of these conditions occur in the first and second rounds. This is important because during the first round, one can easily change M so that all the conditions are satisfied because at that point one has complete control over M and any changes do not affect prior computation. The Chinese team denoted these types of changes as "single-message modifications" or "single-step modifications." We will adopt and use the former terminology. Some round two conditions may also be corrected by other methods, which we will refer to as "multi-message modifications," but these methods are considerably more complicated because one has to be sure, because of the initial message expansion, that changes to M do not affect the computation of earlier rounds.
We present efficient methods [8, 14] which satisfy all but 30 conditions for the first block, and all but 24 conditions for the second block. The remaining conditions are satisfied in a probabilistic manner. On the assumption that each condition is satisfied with probability 1/2, an expected 2 30 (2 24 , resp) messages need to be generated before a message M is found which satisfies all the first (second, resp) block conditions. This estimate is actually a tad low, because it does not account for the fact that the conditions on the Q i are necessary, but not sufficient, for the step differentials to hold, even in the later rounds where the differentials cannot be satisfied deterministically.
The Dirty Details

Outline of method
Once we are convinced that the attack works in theory, we proceed to implementation. The code we wrote as part of this project uses the following rough outline [8, 14] :
Algorithm Find Collision while collision found is false do 4. Satisfy all possible second round conditions and differentials using multi-message modification methods (probabilistic, but computationally insignificant to next step).
5. Check to see if all other conditions and differentials are satisfied (probabilistic).
6. if (all differentials satisfied) then collision found ← true
There are several speed-ups to the above pseudocode. The main one is this: instead of selecting new random values Q 0:15 every time a condition isn't satisfied, just change M slightly so that all first round and most second round conditions are still satisfied.
"Sufficient" conditions
The conditions presented in [14] as sufficient for all first-round differentials to hold, are not. Thus, it is necessary to satisfy some of the first round differentials probabilisitically; this step is computationally insignificant compared to fulfilling the second-, third-, and fourth-round conditions and does not affect the overall runtime. In practice, this means that our code randomly chooses M , performs the first round singlemessage modifications, then checks to see if the differentials are satisfied. If so, great -the code proceeds to the second round multi-message modifications. If not, a new random M is chosen and the process is repeated.
Single-message modification
Single-message modification is the process by which a message M is modified such that all of the first round conditions hold. The term originates with the Wang papers on MD4 and MD5 [13, 14] in which the same method is also referred to as "single-step modification." It is probably named so because to correct the conditions on any one Q i , 0 ≤ i < 16, only one message block m i needs to be modified.
The method of single-message modification we present here is slightly different from that given in the Wang et al. papers, for two reasons. One is that there are some details omitted in the Wang papers (perhaps for simplicity's sake) on the method of single-message modification; if one uses those papers as a guide, inevitably the code will produce incorrect and/or otherwise useless output because some of their instructions are based on the incorrect assumption that shifting and carry expansion commute. We also feel that the methods we present are easier to initially understand.
The idea behind single-message modification is simple. Select the step value so that all conditions hold and recompute the message word from the chosen step value. We present some pseudocode to perform step (2) from the program outline in subsection 5.1. For i going from 0 to 15 do the following:
1. Change Q i to satisfy conditions by simple bit-flipping.
Calculate
Note that this is just simple algebraic manipulation of the step update function.
At the end of this method all step values are correctly computed from the changed message words and all first round conditions are satisfied. If we are using the original set of conditions, the first round differentials may not be satisfied. As noted in the previous subsection, we satisfy these differentials probabilistically and therefore may need to run the single-message modifications over many choices of M before all first conditions and differentials hold. Although not deterministic, this method has time complexity vastly less than that of the overall collision-finding program.
Multi-message modification
One of the key ideas in the Chinese papers is that of multi-message modification. This is where after the satisfaction of all first-round conditions has occurred, one may alter several message blocks together to satisfy second round conditions while leaving all first-round conditions satisfied. Despite the importance of these methods for decreasing the time complexity of the attack, the description in [13, 14] is either completely omitted or brief and truncated. We seek here to fully explain the mystery of multi-message modification techniques by covering the general ideas behind the method and then walking through a few (new) examples in detail.
General Idea. In [14] the method of multi-message modification is given, almost entirely, in a table similar to the following:
The table is a guide to correcting the condition on Q 16,31 , or a 5,32 in the notation from [14] . The condition is that this bit must be 0. The first column denotes the step number. The second column and third columns denote the message word and the shift value, respectively, used in the computation of the step value. The column under the heading "Modify m i " details the update needed to correct the step value or message word in that step. The last column lists updates to step variables, if any, after the modification for that step.
How does this all work? Let's walk through the 
So this is the gist of multi-message modification, but this simple trick does not handle all cases, and unfortunately the details to some of the trickier modifications are not to be found in the Chinese papers. In the next section we go through an example of a slightly more complex multi-message modification, in addition to attempting to explain the motivation for each step in the method. We hope that by doing so the reader gains a deeper understanding of the (as yet more-or-less unexplained) method.
1st block multi-message modification
Here we present our methods for finding the first block pair, based on the methods found in [8, 14] . Before detailing our new methods for satisfying three extra conditions, we review and correct the collision-finding pseudocode in Klima's paper [8] .
1st Block Collision-Finding Program Outline. Klima is able to satisfy four extra conditions from [14] through some clever probabilistic multi-message modifications. The following outline is nearly identical to that which is presented in Klima's full paper [8] . There are a couple of mistakes in Klima's multi-message modification methods as presented in his paper, however. A few of the steps are out of order and some crucial steps are omitted. Here is how the code should look (using our notation with shifted indices):
1. We choose Q 2:15 fulfilling conditions. 2. We compute m 6:15 : For i going from 6 to 15 do 
8. Compute Q 1 from new values of m 1 , Q 0 :
9. Compute m 2:5 : For i going from 2 to 5 do
For step 3, we chose to satisfy the conditions on Q 16:18 probabilistically, by simply randomly selecting Q 16 and checking to see whether the other conditions were satisfied. There are only 9 conditions for these three chaining variables, so this can be done quickly. Sometimes no selection of Q 16 will satisfy the conditions, so in this case our code simply begins anew by randomly selecting another Q 2:15 such that the first round conditions are satisfied.
4
After step 9, we continue the computation, checking to see if the remaining conditions are satisfied (each condition is expected to be satisfied with probability near 1/2, so we expect to iterate over the above pseudocode 2 30 times before we find a suitable first block pair). If a condition isn't satisfied, then we have to choose a new message. We do this efficiently by iterating over all possible 2 31 values of Q 19 in step 5 (simply incrementing Q 19 after each failed attempt is the fastest way). If we exhaust all possible values for Q 19 without finding a suitable message, we return to step 3 and select another value for Q 16 . In this manner we avoid significant unnecessary computation.
New Multi-Message Modification Methods
We now cover the details of our methods which reduce the overall complexity of the attack to an expected 2 30 MD5 computations. In subsection 5.4 we covered the basic idea behind multi-message modifications and went over a simple example. However, not all second-round conditions can be handled as easily. In previous papers [13, 14] , these more complicated methods are not described at all. Therefore our approach will be to walk through our techniques in detail, attempting to explain our methodology at each step so that the reader gains not only an understanding of our techniques, but hopefully insight into the general technique of multi-message modifications as well.
6.1 New multi-message modifications for correcting Q 20,17 and Q 20,31 .
These modifications take into account all the modifications that Klima has done to correct the conditions on Q 0:19 . These methods satisfy the two conditions on Q 20 or a 6 (Wang's notation).
Outline of Method. We set up a few conditions on Q 16:19 so that flipping a couple of bits of Q 18 and Q 19 does not affect earlier computations but with high probability satisfies the two conditions on Q 20 . For example, bit 31 of Q 20 must be set to 0. Let's say it is 1. Note how Q 20 is computed:
We set conditions on Q 17:19 so that by default the value of the 26th bit of G(Q 19 , Q 18 , Q 17 ) is 0, but that if we flip the 26th bits of both Q 19 and Q 18 then the value of the 26th bit G(Q 19 , Q 18 , Q 17 ) changes to 1. To derive such conditions, one has to look at how the function G is computed, but it can easily be verified that if the 26th bits of Q 18 and Q 19 are 0, then the 26th bit of G(Q 19 , Q 18 , Q 17 ) will be zero, and if the 26th bits of Q 19 and Q 18 are flipped to 1, then the 26th bit of G(Q 19 , Q 18 , Q 17 ) will also be flipped. Flipping the 26th bit of G(Q 19 , Q 18 , Q 17 ) in this manner has the net effect of adding 2 31 + 2 26 to the value of Q 20 because we have added 2 26 to Q 19 , which occurs twice in the computation of Q 20 (once in the computation of G() and once by addition to T 19 ≪ 5). Adding 2 31 flips the most significant bit of Q 20 , like we wanted, and the addition of 2 26 , which we cannot really avoid, will only re-flip the most significant bit of Q 20 if the next 5 most significant bits of Q 20 were originally set, which occurs with probability 1/32.
At this point the observant reader may ask "Why did we have to flip the 26th bits of both Q 19 and Q 18 ?". "Why not just flip the 26th bit of Q 19 ?" Here's why: Remember back in Klima's code how m 0 was computed: 4 We implement this by setting a reasonable upper limit on the number of random selections of Q 16 which are chosen and tested before we select new values for Q 2:15 .
If we just changed Q 19 , we would have to re-compute m 0 , which would affect the computation of m 5 a couple of steps later, and Q 20 would likewise be affected. In fact, changing m 0 by one bit in this way can change m 5 by a bunch of bits, so we must be very careful so we don't have to modify it for our methods to work. By changing both Q 19 and Q 18 in the same way, the changes cancel each other out and m 0 is not changed, so long as G(Q 18 , Q 17 , Q 16 ) is not affected by these changes. It can easily be verified that requiring the condition Q 16,26 = 0 satisfies this goal (1 more condition). It is important to note that these added conditions do not significantly affect the performance of the overall code because they are satisfied in step 3 of Klima's code. Instead of 9 conditions to probabilistically satisfy in step 3, we now have 11, which is still tiny in comparison to the overall runtime.
Okay. So we've sneakily changed Q 19 and Q 18 so that m 0 is unaffected and a condition on Q 20 is fulfilled with high probability. Now we have to fix everything else. We recompute the value of m 11 from the new value of Q 18 by the following:
And we now have to recompute Q 11 from m 11 .
Luckily the changes we made to m 11 don't affect any of the 15 conditions on Q 11 , so long as bit 2 of Q 11 is originally set to 0 (so that we don't have to worry about carries). So we add this condition to the listagain, it is fulfilled "for free" by the single-message modification methods presented in the Wang papers (or by the fact that Q 11 is initially arbitrarily chosen in the Klima paper).
The only thing left to do is to recompute m 12:15 to absorb the changes in Q 11 . This can be done without changing any of the other Q variables by simply recomputing m 12:15 as we did earlier:
That's it. At the end of everything we have changed Q 19 and Q 18 so that one condition on Q 20 has been changed with probability 31/32, m 11 and Q 11 have been changed, but without affecting the conditions on Q 11 , and m 12−15 have been changed to absorb the changes in Q 11 so that no other Q values are affected.
The exact same method can be used to correct the condition on the 17th bit of Q 20 (just shift all bit values above by 14). There are a total of 8 new conditions that this method requires, but they are all more or less "free."
It is possible that the above methods fail to correct the specified conditions, but the probability that this happens is bounded above by 1/32 + 1/32 = 1/16.
After each iteration, our code goes back to starting values for m 11:15 , Q 11 , and Q 18 , because we need the correct bits of Q 11 and Q 18 to be set so that flipping them to satisfy Q 20 can occur safely.
New Modifications for Correcting the Condition on Q 21 . When used with Klima's methods, the above modifications reduce the number of probabilistically-satisfied conditions to 31. We now detail another multi message modification to reduce that number to 30.
The method we use here is based on the multi message modifications explained above to correct for the conditions on Q 16 . Essentially, we will make a change to one of the message words to correct the condition and then change the other necessary message words and step values in order to 'absorb' the changes. Unfortunately, this method is not quite as straightforward as the method to correct conditions on Q 16 as detailed in subsection 5.4.
The first reason for the added complexity is this: at step 21, we have used a number of message words in the second round. Namely, m 1 , m 6 , m 11 , m 0 , m 5 , and m 10 . Any modification methods must not change these message words, otherwise earlier second-round computations will be affected. Our methods get around this by setting up conditions on first-round step values so that we use the properties of the Φ function to avoid changing these message words.
The other reason we can't use the same method as for correcting conditions on Q 16 is that in this case the methods affect conditions on earlier step values. Specifically, here is the problem we encounter if we try to use the same method: we are trying to correct the condition Q 21,31 = 0. The shift value for round 21 is 9, so to correct the condition we can change m 10 so that m new 10 ← m 10 + 2 22 . However, m 10 is used in the computation of Q 10 , a round for which the shift value is 17. Thus, when we update the value of Q 10 , we essentially update the value Q new 10 ← Q 10 + 2 7 . This is a problem because there is a condition on Q 10,7 which we change. Furthermore, in order to absorb the changes to Q 10 we would almost certainly have to modify m 11 , which would affect earlier round-two computations. So it appears we have to do something different.
The trick in this case is to instead fix the condition by manipulating the values of bit 22 of Q 7 , Q 8 , Q 9 , and Q 10 so that we can modify m 10 without modifying any other bit values of Q 10 and without modifying m 11 .
Here is the method:
• Add the following first-round conditions: Q 7,22 = 0, Q 8,22 = 1, Q 9,22 = 0 and Q 10,22 = 0.
• If the condition on Q 21,31 is not satisfied, do the following:
-Flip bit 22 of Q 9 to 1 (denote change as Q new 9 ← Q 9 + 2 22 ).
-Recompute m 9 to reflect this change
-Recompute m 12 and m 13
This process looks similar to the technique present earlier in subsection 5.4, but the following question naturally arises: Why doesn't m 11 need to be modified? The trick is looking at the values of F in these rounds before and after the change to Q 9,22 . We're not really concerned with how changing Q 9,22 affects m 9 , m 12 , or m 13 , but we would like m we obtain that
This change to m 10 will almost certainly have the desired effect on Q 21 because Q new 21 = Q 21 − 2 31 − 2 14 . The factor of 2 14 will only affect bit 31 of Q 21 if bits 14 through 30 of Q 21 are zero, which occurs with probability 1/2 17 . Now we just have to make sure that this change to Q 9,22 doesn't affect m 11 . Let's look at how m 11 might be affected.
It is clear that m 11 will only change if F (Q 10 , Q 9 , Q 8 ) = F (Q 10 , Q new 9 , Q 8 ). We only have to check if bit 22 changes. Because bit 22 of Q 10 is 0, bit 22 of F (Q 10 , Q 9 , Q 8 ) and F (Q 10 , Q new 9 , Q 8 ) are both equal to Q 8,22 = 1. Thus m 11 is not changed.
Performance. We ran code based on the work done by [12] , modified with our extra methods, to find the first block 80 times run on a desktop 3.0 GHz processor. The total time to find all 80 blocks was just under ten hours seven minutes, giving an average time per block of 455 seconds. We also found a second block, one for each first block found with corresponding IV s, in a total time of just under four hours 23 minutes, giving an average time of 197 seconds per block found. Overall, full two-block collisions were found, on average, in under 11 minutes. This is a dramatic improvement over the timings given by Klima, even after correcting for discrepancies in hardware.
2nd block multi-message modification
The following is a method that is very similar to one described in the Klima paper with complexity 2 24 . The complexity turns out to be closer to 2 26 due to the insufficiency of the conditions on the step values. This method satisfies conditions and differentials through Q 0:20 . The rest of the conditions and differentials are satisfied probabilistically. There are 24 remaining conditions on Q 21:63 , along with conditions on T 22,17 , T 34,15 , and T 61,15 .
This method modifies Q 7:11 , while leaving m 11 unmodified. Since m 1 , m 6 , m 11 , m 0 , m 5 are unchanged, we know the conditions for Q 16:20 remain satisfied.
Performance for Second Block Multi-Message Modification. At first the second block multimessage modification performed quickly, but was rather inconsistent. Often the program had difficulty completing steps 4-6 quickly. We were able to remedy this by returning to step one after a prescribed number of iterations. Other times the program would simply be unable to find a collision in a reasonable amount of time. After a number of trial runs we realized that a majority of collisions were found when step 7 had been reached less than 4096 times and of those that were found when step seven had been reached more than 4096 times, many were found after step seven had been reached many more than 4096 times. Thus if we detect that step seven has been reached more than 4096 times we select a new random message.
Once our program performed consistently, we performed tests on the second block multi-message modification using a Dell Latitude D610 running at 1.6 GHz. We were able to find 85 second block messages in 4 hours 29 minutes. The mean running time was 3 minutes 9 seconds, with a range from 5 seconds to 10 minutes. This method for second block multi-message modification has close to the same running time as the method used by the Chinese team using a IBM P690. The method we used for second block multi-message modification turns out to be 25-50 times faster than the method used by the Chinese Team, based on the performance difference of the IBM P690 and a 1.6 GHz Pentium M [8] .
A New Method
At the end of the previous section we discussed how some analysis of trends in the running time of the program to find the second blocks could lead to decreased time complexity. This suggests a general technique to reduce the search space which may be incorporated into the methods already presented.
In the example covered in the previous section, we noted that, for whatever reason, certain sets of values for the step values were more likely to find an acceptable second block than others, and that there is a simple way to test to see if a set of values is not in this desired group. The general technique can be described simply as this, verifified experimentally but not analytically:
Relying on the fact that the step update function is not very random, we can attempt to identify patterns in the step values which tend to yield solutions. Using this knowledge, we narrow our search space to use only step values which fall within these patterns.
Another Example. The methods presented in section 6 provide an analytic method to satisfy conditions on Q 20 with probability near 15/16 (approximately 94% of the time). Although the analytic solution works, it nearly doubles the computation over the main iterative loop, thus weakening its positive impact on the running time of our collision-finding program. However, we were also able to obtain an equally or perhaps more effective (satisfied conditions around 97% of the time on tests) method for satisfying conditions on Q 20 .
The pattern is simple. While iterating through values of Q 19 , as in step 5 of the pseudocode in section 5.5, there are distinct patterns in which values of Q 19 automatically satisfy conditions on Q 20 . That is, ignoring our new multi-message modifications for Q 20 , we tried to identify which values of Q 19 led to conditions on Q 20 being satisfied. We found that values of Q 19 which satisfied conditions on Q 20 often occurred sequentially in blocks of 128 followed by 128 consecutive values of Q 19 which didn't satisfy conditions on Q 20 . There were exceptions to this pattern, but the correlation was strong enough to reduce the time complexity. This suggests a new method for satisfying conditions on Q 20 that requires much less computation:
• While iterating over values of Q 19 , check to see if the conditions on Q 20 are satisfied. If not, add 127
to Q 19 and continue.
Restricting the values of Q 19 in this manner yields an algorithm for which around 97% of all used values of Q 19 satisfy conditions on Q 20 , with the additional benefit that very little overhead is needed compared to the other multi-message modification method.
The Method. We have not attempted to systematically identify and define this approach within our own work. It was merely that through a casual analysis of data patterns observed during coding, we noticed this phenomenon. Nonetheless, it seems that we used the following rough methodology:
• Record values for intermediate step values as well as result (Were all differentials satisfied with these values? If not -how many were satisfied?). Do this for many random choices of M .
• Attempt to find simple patterns in these step values which will yield a good heuristic.
This procedure can have broad or narrow scope. With the above example, we looked at consecutive values of Q 19 and checked only two conditions on Q 20 . Broadening the scope may yield results, or it may decrease the chances that simple patterns will be easy to find. The above technique seems possible to automate so that no human interaction is necessary and we believe this is a possible avenue for future research. We suspect that artificial intelligence techniques could be especially useful with this sort of analysis. The main drawback to this method is that one might not be able to easily understand why these patterns of data exist. In general, it seems preferable to do as much analysis as possible, but it seems likely that an automated tool to detect these kinds of patterns may be used with great success after analysis becomes too cumbersome or fruitless.
Step 
